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Abstract 
This paper examines the determinants of hospital stay intensity, the decision to seek hospital 
care as a public or private patient and the decision to purchase private hospital insurance. We 
describe a theoretical model to motivate the simultaneous nature of these decisions. For the 
empirical analysis, we develop a simultaneous equation econometric model that 
accommodates the count data nature of length of stay and the binary nature of the patient type 
and insurance decisions. The model also accounts for the endogeneity of the patient type and 
insurance binary variables. The results indicate that there is no evidence of endogeneity 
between the decision to purchase insurance on the type and intensity of hospital care use. We 
find some evidence of moral hazard effects of private hospital insurance on the intensity of 
private hospital care. The results also indicate that the length of hospital stay for private 
patients is shorter than for public patients. 
 
JEL classification: I11, H42, C31, C15 
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In many developed countries including Australia and the UK, the public sector plays a
dominant role in the nancing of medical care. In these health systems, public hospital
services are provided free at the point of use and waiting lists feature predominantly as
resource allocation mechanisms to control access to services. Usually, a private hospital
market coexist alongside the public sector, and it delivers private care that is nanced
either through direct payments or private health insurance.
With the rapidly growing public expenditure on health and long-term care predicted
to escalate further in the future, governments have sought to identify and implement
alternative mechanisms to nance the health care demands of their populace. Among the
strategies explored, the expansion of private health care markets through greater reliance
of private health insurance have generated considerable attention among policy makers
(Colombo and Tapay 2004). The eects of private markets for health care on the public
health care system have been the subject of extensive debate. It is often argued that a
private health care market can relieve pressures o the public system in an environment of
budget and capacity constraints which leads to faster access and higher quality care in the
public sector. Private health care is also perceived to enhance consumers' choice and the
responsiveness of health systems to the diversity of tastes and needs. However, questions
have been raised on whether a mixed public-private approach to the provision of health
care diverts resources away from the public sector particularly in a regime where doctors
are allowed to practice in both sectors. Issues surrounding the equity of access arise as
individuals with private health insurance, who usually have high incomes, can gain faster
access to elective surgeries which in the public sector would involve signicant waiting
times.
Understanding the determinants of individuals' decisions to purchase private health
insurance, and how these decisions inuence the choice to seek public or private health
care, and the intensity of care, will be crucial in assessing the eects of private health in-
surance on the performance of health systems with mixed nancing. Within the available
literature, studies have examined each of these decisions either separately or in combina-
tion with one other theme. In the literature on the demand for public and private care,
1the main subject of interest is how `prices', viz- a-viz waiting times and private health
insurance, inuence the demand for public and private medical care. In the absence of
explicit monetary prices for public health care, the cost of waiting on waiting lists per-
form the rationing role that market prices traditionally play and the expected duration of
wait inuences individuals' decisions to join waiting lists (Lindsay and Feigenbaum 1984).
When a private alternative to public care is available, individuals weigh the cost of waiting
on waiting lists against the price of private treatment in formulating their choices (Cullis
and Jones 1986). The empirical evidence in this literature generally nds that the demand
for public medical care is negatively inuenced by waiting times associated with obtain-
ing medical care from the public sector (McAvinchey and Yannopoulos 1993; Martin and
Smith 1999), and that the demand for private sector care is positively associated with
the availability of private health insurance (Gertler and Strum 1997; Srivastava and Zhao
2008). Individuals' choices between public and private care have also been observed to be
persistent over time (Propper 2000) .
The relationship between health care use and private health insurance, in health sys-
tems where the public sector plays a dominant role, has been examined by a number of
studies. The empirical evidence from Australia and Ireland have found that individu-
als with private insurance have higher usage health care services (Cameron et al. 1988;
Harmon and Nolan 2001), and have a higher duration of private hospital stays (Savage
and Wright 2003). In Germany, it is shown that the availability of add-on insurance does
not lead to a higher number of hospital and doctor visits (Riphahn et al. 2003). A key
methodological issue that these studies have to address is that individuals' insurance status
is potentially endogenous to health care use. This problem arises because of simultaneity
in these decisions { that the demand for health care is inuenced by the availability of
insurance, and the decision to purchase health insurance in turn depends on the expected
utilisation of health services in the future (Cameron et al. 1988).
This paper distinguishes from previous studies in that we empirically investigate the
determinants of hospital stay intensity and the choices between public or private care and
private hospital insurance using a simultaneous framework. We argue that these decisions
are simultaneously determined and propose an econometric model that accommodates the
count data nature of the hospital length of stay and accounts for the potential endogene-
2ity in the binary variables that represent the outcomes of the patient type1 and insurance
decisions. This econometric model is novel and contributes to the literature on simulta-
neous equation count data models. Models such as the Poisson and Negative Binomial
models have been the traditional workhorse models employed to analyse non-negative and
integer-valued (count) outcomes and have been widely applied to many elds within eco-
nomics. These models have been extended into more advanced models with a variety of
applications such as the multivariate count data models (e.g. Munkin and Trivedi 1999;
Riphahn et al. 2003; Fabbri and Monfardini 2009; Hellstr om 2006) and count models with
selectivity and endogenous regressors (Terza 1998, van Ophem 2000; Greene 2005). There
has been to date only a handful of studies that attempt to extend count data models
to a system of simultaneous equations. Some examples are Atella and Deb (2008) who
examined the utilsation of primary care and specialists services with a multivariate count
data models in a system of equations, and Deb and Trivedi (2006) who developed a count
data model with endogenous multinomial treatment outcomes using a Negative Binomial
and multinomial mixed logit mixture with latent factors.
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes a model of
demand for hospital care, the choice of admission as a public or private patient and the
decision to purchase insurance. Section 3 presents the econometric model and estimation
strategy. Section 4 describes how hospital care is nanced in Australia, the data used in
the empirical analysis and discusses the identication strategy. The results are discussed
in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the key ndings in the
paper.
2 Economic Model
In this section, a simple theoretical model is developed to describe how individuals make
decisions on the demand for hospital care, the choice between admission as a public or
private patient, and the decision to purchase insurance. We use this theoretical model to
1\Patient type decision" refers to the decision to use medical services as a private or a public patient. A
person without private insurance can still choose to pay the full fee out of pocket to use medical facilities
as a private patient in order to see a particular doctor or avoid the waiting time. More importantly in the
case of Australia, a person with private insurance may choose to use medical services as a public patient
if he or she thinks that for his or her particular illness there is no advantage in paying the co-payment to
be a private patient.
3elaborate the simultaneous nature of these decisions.
We consider an individual whose utility is directly inuenced by his or her health. The
individual's health is adversely aected by the incidence of illness, and although the indi-
vidual can inuence his or her health by life style choices and health related expenditures
to some extent, it is assumed that the individual cannot reduce the probability of illness
to zero. Specically, the random variable S (denoting the severity of illness) can take
any integer value from 0 to N where 0 corresponds to the situation where the individual
is well or in perfect health and 1;:::;N represent health states that are associated with
the incidence of progressively more serious medical conditions. The probability of any
outcome s of S is denoted by (s) which is assumed to be positive for all s and for all
individuals. While we do not index  (and other variables) by i to simplify the notation,
it is understood that these probabilities can depend on individual characteristics such as
age, gender and life habits.
We assume that the utility function of the individual in each state s is given by the
following general form
U = U(C;h(s)) (1)
where C denotes the level of consumption and h is the individual's health. It is assumed
that conditional on s, U() is a strictly concave function of C and h. The health function
h has its maximum value when the individual is in perfect health (i.e., when s = 0). In the
presence of illness (i.e., when s > 0), the individual can mitigate the reduction in health
by using hospital care at intensity m and quality q. The relationship between health h
and hospital care m, q in health state s is characterised by the health production function
















@q2  0 for all s > 0: (4)
The utilisation intensity measure m can be characterised as a vector of health care
inputs (e.g. doctor/surgeon time, bed days, number of diagnostic tests) or aggregate
measures such as the number of hospitalisation episodes over a predetermined duration
of time and the length of hospital stay. The quality indicator q, on the other hand, is
a composite index function that describes the quality attributes of hospital care. These
include the length of waiting time on hospital waiting lists, amenities such as private
hospital rooms and the choice of treatment doctor. We impose two assumptions on m and
q to make the theoretical model consistent with the available data used in the empirical
analysis. Firstly, given that the observed measure of hospital care intensity examined
in the empirical analysis is an aggregate measure (namely the length of hospital stay),
we assume here that m is one-dimensional. Secondly, we observe in the data a binary
outcome variable whether individuals chose to seek publicly (Medicare) funded hospital
care or obtain care as a private patient. Hence, we assume that the quality indicator
q 2 f0;1g, with q = 0 if the individual chooses to receive public care, and q = 1 otherwise.
Public hospital care is provided free at the point of demand but public patients may
experience lengthy waiting times, are not entitled to private accommodations and do not
have the choice of treating doctor. An alternative to public hospital care is private care
that involve shorter length of time waiting and higher quality amenities. Suppose each
unit of private hospital care is supplied at an average price of Pm. This includes the price
of quality goods that a private patient can choose, such as a private room or a reputable
doctor. Since our data set only contains information about whether a patient chooses to
use the hospital services as a private or public patient and does not provide information
about what exact services the private patients use during their hospital stay, we use the
average price rather than a disaggregated price vector for a menu of services available
to private patients. Suppose both public and private patients face an indirect price Pind
associated with each unit of hospital care that arises from the cost of traveling to hospitals
5and loss of income as a result of hospitalisation. The total direct and indirect costs of
private and public hospital care are (Pm + Pind)m and (Pind)m respectively.
Prior to the realisation of the health state s, the individual can purchase private
hospital insurance at a xed premium of P which reduces the direct cost of private care
to Pmm where  2 [0;1) is the cost sharing parameter. Let the choice to purchase
insurance be denoted by d, where d 2 f0;1g, where d = 1 when the individual purchases
insurance and d = 0 otherwise. Suppose, the expenditures on consumption, insurance
premium and private hospital care are aorded through income Y that is derived from
both labour and non-labour sources. Based on the above assumptions, the individual faces
a budget constraint
Y = C + dP + [1   d(1   )]qPmm + Pindm (5)
which is dependent on the choice to purchase insurance d and the decision to obtain
hospital care as a public or private patient q. We assume that the individual is an expected





given the budget constraint in (5). The solutions to the resource allocation problem
is obtained iteratively by rst solving the optimal intensity of hospital care ~ md;q(s) for
each insurance d and patient type strategy q, conditional on health state s. Conditional
on insurance strategy d and health state s, the optimal intensity of hospital care if the
individual chooses to obtain medical services as a public patient (q = 0) is
~ md;0(s) = m[Pind;Y   dP;s] (7)
and private care (q = 1) is
~ md;1(s) = m[(1   d(1   ))Pm;Pind;Y   dP;s] (8)
Equation (7) shows that the optimal intensity of public hospital care is a function of the
indirect unit cost of obtaining care, income minus the outlay for insurance premiums and
6the severity of illness. Equation (8) shows the optimal intensity of private hospital care
depends on the eective price of private care which is a function of the availability of
insurance, in addition to the similar set of factors that inuence the intensity of public
care. One result that can be expected from (8) is that the optimal intensity of private
hospital care is increasing in the generosity of insurance (given by a lower cost sharing
parameter ). This eect is referred to as ex post moral hazard where insurance lowers the
eective price of medical care and hence increasing utilisation and medical expenditures
(Pauly 1986).
The solutions ~ md;q(s) for all possible values of d, q and s are used to obtain the decision
rule on the choice of admission into hospital as a public or private patient by substituting
(7) and (8) into the health production function (2) and the utility function (1). Let Vd;q(s)
denote the individual's indirect utility associated with insurance strategy d and patient
type strategy q. Conditional on insurance choice d and health state s, the individual will
choose private care if
Vd;1(s) > Vd;0(s) (9)
and will choose public care otherwise. These binary comparisons for every possible values
of d and s determine the optimal choice of admission into hospital as a public or private
patient, i.e. they dene
~ q(d;s) = argmax
q2f0;1g
Vd;q(s): (10)
The pair f~ q(d;s); ~ md;~ q(d;s)(s)g characterises the type of care and the intensity of care
that the individual would optimally choose at each possible value of d and s, i.e. with and
without private insurance and facing every possible severity of illness. Substituting these
choices in the utility function, we obtain V 
d (s) for d = f0;1g and s = 1;:::;N, which are
the highest utility that the individual can obtain by making optimal decisions at every
contingency with and without health insurance. These utility values together with the
known probability distribution of illness severity determine the expected utility with and
without health insurance. The expected utility associated with the purchase of insurance










Correspondingly, the expected utility associated with not purchasing private hospital










The individual will decide to purchase or not to purchase private hospital insurance
to maximise expected utility before the health state s is known. The optimal choice is
therefore given by
~ d = argmax
d2f0;1g
EVd: (13)
The triplet f~ d; ~ q(~ d;:); ~ m~ d;~ q(~ d;:)(:)g, in which ~ d is a constant but the other two elements
are functions of illness severity, completely characterises the insurance choice and also
type of care and the intensity of care that the individual will optimally choose in every
possible illness contingency. It should be clear from the above that after the insurance
purchase decision is made and a certain health status is observed, the individual does not
benet from deviating from the plan dictated by this triplet. It should also be clear from
this analysis that any unobserved individual specic eects in preferences or in health
production that, all else constant, cause one individual to be on the right tail of the
distribution of hospital care intensity and/or to have preference for a particular form of
care (public versus private) will aect the insurance choice decision. At the same time,
the decisions of what form of care to choose and at what intensity are inuenced by
the insurance choice. This analysis shows the simultaneous nature of these decisions, i.e.
although chronologically the insurance decision is observed rst and the care type and care
intensity decisions are observed only after an illness, these decisions are made according
to a complete contingent plan that was determined at the time of making the decision to
purchase or not to purchase private health insurance.
The model can be extended to make it more realistic. For example, in the model
presented above the dierence between waiting times for receiving public and private care
8is captured only through the dependence of the health production function on q. This
assumes that waiting times only inuence individuals through aecting their capacity to
enjoy life as healthy persons, and waiting times do not aect their budget constraint (recall
that the loss of income in the budget constraint is bundled in Pindm that is proportional
to the actual time spent in the hospital and does not change with the type of care). If this
assumption is not correct and some individuals actually loose part of their income while
waiting for an elective surgery, and if this information is available in a data set, then the
model can and should be modied. Also, there are income tax incentives associated with
the purchase of health insurance in Australia that can also be accommodated.
We have presented this bare-bones theoretical model to highlight that none of the three
decisions { insurance choice, care type and care intensity { can be taken as exogenous for
the other two. The model that we specify in the subsequent sections takes endogeneity
seriously and is congruent with the count data nature of hospital length of stay and binary
nature of care type and insurance choice variables. However, the exact mapping between
the parameters of this model and the parameters of any particular utility function and
health production function is not explored. Hence, our model is not a fully structural
model in the sense of Keane (2010).
3 Econometric Methods
The model for counts that is adopted in this paper is the Poisson lognormal model which
is derived by introducing a heterogeneity term, as a normally distributed variable, into
the conditional mean equation in the conventional Poisson regression model.2 This model
serves as a convenient platform to accommodate the presence of endogenous binary re-
gressors. The specication of the econometric model is as follows. Let the mi be the
observed duration of hospital stay for the ith individual and qi the patient type binary
variable which takes the value of 1 when private care was chosen and 0 otherwise. The
binary variable di denotes insurance status which assumes a value of 1 if individual i has
private health insurance. Suppose that conditional on the exogenous covariates Xi and
2The Poisson lognormal mixture has been presented in the literature in a variety of ways (Greene 2005).
A specic representation of the model, with an exponential of a normally distributed heterogeneity term,
dates back to Greene (1995) and Million (1998).
9the endogenous variables qi and di, mi follows a Poisson distribution with truncation at







with the conditional mean parameter i
i = exp(Xi + 1di + 2qi + i) (15)
where i is a standardised heterogeneity term which is distributed standard normal, that
is i  N(0;1). The decision rules to obtain hospital care as a public patient and to





i =Zi + 1di + vi (16)
d
i =Wi + i (17)
and vi, i  N(0;1). These latent variables correspond to Vd;1 Vd;0 in equation (9) and to
EV1   EV0 from equations (11) and (12) respectively. Considering these latent variables
as utility dierentials, it becomes apparent that they are related to the observed care type






The RHS variables qi and di in equation (15) and di in (16) are allowed to be endoge-
nous by assuming that i, vi and i are correlated. More specically, it is assumed that





In the notation N2[(1;2);(2
1;2
2);],  denotes the mean, 2 the variance and  the cor-
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Extending the framework outlined in Terza (1998), the joint conditional density for the
observed data f(mi;qi;di j





(1   qi)(1   di)f(mi j Xi;qi = 0;di = 0;i) P(qi = 0;di = 0 j 
i;i)+
(qi)(1   di)f(mi j Xi;qi = 1;di = 0;i)P(qi = 1;di = 0 j 
i;i)+
(1   qi)(di)f(mi j Xi;qi = 0;di = 1;i)P(qi = 0;di = 1 j 
i;i)+





i = (Xi [ Zi [ Wi). From (15), (16), (17), (20) and (21), we can deduce that the
joint probability of the four possible outcomes of the pair (qi;di) conditional on Zi, Wi
and i can be succinctly written as
g(qi;di jZi;Wi;i) = 2[y1i1;y2i2;] (22)
11where
1 =














In the above, y1i = 2qi  1 and y2i = 2di  1. 2 denotes the bivariate normal cumulative
density function. Hence, f(mi;qi;di j
i;i) in (21) may be expressed as
f(mi;qi;di j
i;i) = f(mi jXi;qi;di;i)  g(qi;di jZi;Wi;i) (23)
We emphasise again that the above applies only to those individuals who have been
hospitalised in the observation period. For non-hospitalised individuals we only observe
di and 
i, but the probability density of di conditional on 
i can be conveniently deduced
from equations (16), (18) and (19). Hence, if we dene the indicator variable Hi where
Hi = 1 if the i-th individual has been hospitalised and 0 otherwise, then the contribution
of every observation to the likelihood function can be succinctly expressed as






where  is the set of all unknown parameters in equations (15), (16), (17) and (19).
Equation (24) will be used to construct the log-likelihood function which we will use to
estimate the model. The estimation strategy for the three equation econometric model
outlined above will be discussed in the next section.
3.1 Estimation
Evaluation of the joint conditional density function in (24) requires the evaluation of an
integral. Given that this integral does not have a closed-form expression, it is approximated
using simulation methods (Gouri eroux and Monfort 1996). Suppose s
i denote the s-th
12draw of  from the standard normal density (i). The simulated likelihood contribution
for the i-th observation is





























The maximum simulated likelihood estimator (MSL) maximises the simulated log-
likelihood in (26). Quasi-Monte Carlo draws based on the Halton sequence was used in the
simulations which have been demonstrated to be faster and more accurate as compared the
conventional random number generator (Bhat 2001, Train 2003). In choosing a practical
number of simulations, S was increased stepwise by a factor of 2 from a minimum of 50 to
a maximum of 3000. Thereafter, the estimates were examined to determine if the results
vary signicantly with increasing values of S. We used S=2000 in our study, beyond which
the results obtained were very similar.
The Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman (BHHH) quasi-Newton algorithm was used to
maximise the simulated likelihood using numerical derivatives. The variance of the MSL
estimates were computed post convergence using the \cluster-robust" formula (Deb and
Trivedi 2002, p.608). The robust sandwich formula is more appropriate compared with
the information matrix and outer product formula as the former takes into account the
inuence of simulation noise (Mcfadden and Train 2000). Moreover, given that the sample
includes multiple observations from each household in the data (e.g. couples in a family
income unit), the \cluster-robust" formula accounts for this sampling scheme instead of
treating each observation as independent.
The marginal eects for the Poisson model is calculated in two ways. For a continuous
explanatory variable xj, the coecient j is a semi-elasticity. Therefore, an increase in
xj by 0.01 changes the expected length of stay E(mjX) by j percent. In the case of a
13binary explanatory variable xj, this is expressed as a proportional change in the expected










i6=j ixi = ej (27)
For binary outcome variables, the marginal eect of a change in the continuous variable
Xk is given as (X ^ )  @(X ^ )=@Xk where ^  are the estimates of the coecients. For
discrete explanatory variables, the marginal eect when Xk changes from 0 to 1 is given
as (X ^  jXk = 1)   (X ^  jXk = 0). The standard errors of all marginal eects are
calculated using the delta method.
4 Australia's hospital care system and data
4.1 Financing hospital care and private health insurance in Australia
In Australia, health care is nanced predominantly through a compulsory tax-funded
universal health insurance scheme known as Medicare. Introduced in 1984, Medicare
subsidies medical services and technologies according to a schedule of fees referred to
as the Medicare Benet Schedule (MBS). For hospital care, individuals who choose to
be admitted as public or Medicare patients in public hospitals receive free treatment
from doctors and health practitioners nominated by hospitals as well as free hospital
accommodations and meals. Alternatively, individuals may choose to obtain private care
in either private or public hospitals. Private patients are charged fees by doctors and
are billed by hospitals for accommodations, theatres fees, diagnostic tests and medical
supplies such as medications, dressings and other consumables. The fees charged by
doctors to private patients attract a subsidy amounting to 75% of the scheduled fee under
the MBS. The dierence between doctors' fees and the Medicare subsidy is aorded either
as out-of-pocket expenditure or covered by insurers if individuals have private health
insurance. Private hospital charges however do not attract any Medicare subsidy but may
be claimed through private health insurance. In addition to hospital insurance, individuals
can purchase ancillary insurance to cover expenditures on general health services such as
dental care, allied health (e.g. physiotherapy, podiatry) and items such as eye glasses
14which are not covered under Medicare.
The private health insurance market in Australia is a heavily regulated industry. A
key feature is the community rating requirement on private health insurance premiums
which stipulates that insurers must charge the same price for a given insurance contract
regardless of individuals' age, gender and health status. This requirement also prohibits
insurers from setting premiums using information on individuals' utilisation and claims
history. Between 1997 and 2000, signicant policy changes were introduced in the private
health insurance market in Australia. These changes followed active public debate on the
appropriate role of public and private health insurance in the nancing of health care in
Australia amidst the steadily declining private health membership after the introduction of
Medicare. The then prevailing policy stance within the government supported a balanced
public and private involvement in the delivery of health care to ensure both universal
access and choice. The declining private health insurance membership was regarded as
threatening to the nancial viability of the private hospital sector, which could eventually
lead to greater burden on the public hospital system (CDHAC 1999).
The government responded by introducing a series of policy changes with the aim
of encouraging the uptake of private health insurance. The rst of three policies was
the Private Health Insurance Incentive Scheme (PHIIS) introduced in July 1997, which
involved using tax subsidies to encourage the purchase of private health insurance amongst
lower income individuals and tax penalties for individuals without insurance. For the tax
penalty component of PHIIS, singles and families (inclusive of couples) with an annual
household income greater than $50,000 and $100,000 respectively, are liable for a tax levy
(referred to as Medicare Levy Surcharge) amounting to one percent of their taxable income
if they do not have private health insurance. In early 1998, the subsidy component of the
PHIIS was replaced by a non means-tested 30% rebate on health insurance premiums.
The third policy introduced in July 2000 is the Lifetime Community Rating (LCR) which
involved a modication of the community rating regulations and allowed private health
insurance funds to vary insurance premiums according to individuals' age at the time
of entry into funds and the number of years individuals remained insured. See Butler
(2002) for more a full description of the three policies. The implementation of the policies
resulted in a dramatic increase in private health insurance coverage, from a low of 30.1%
15in December 1999 to 45.7% in September 2000 (Butler 2002). Coverage began to drift
downwards again after September 2000 but have since stabilised. At the end of 2005,
roughly 43% of the population have private hospital insurance coverage.
4.2 Data
The empirical analysis uses data from the In-Condence version of the Household, Income
and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. HILDA is a nationally representative
longitudinal survey which collects extensive information on household and family forma-
tion, labour force participation, income and life satisfaction, health and well-being. Every
member aged 15 and over are surveyed via a face-to-face interview and are requested to
complete a self-completion questionnaire. We focus on data from wave 4 (2004) of the
HILDA survey where approximately 12408 individuals from 6987 households were sur-
veyed. A health module, in addition to the core survey questions, was included in wave
4 in which information on hospital care use and private health insurance status was col-
lected. We combined the wave 4 data with responses on self assessed health status from
wave 3 (2003). In the analysis sample, observations where the respondents age is below 25
years and those from multiple family households were excluded. Given the emphasis on
the relationship between hospital care use and private health insurance, individuals with
private health insurance policies that cover only ancillary services were excluded from the
analysis. After excluding observations with missing or ambiguous responses, 7395 obser-
vations remained in the sample of which 962 individuals indicated that they have had at
least one overnight hospitalisation in the last 12 months.
4.3 Hospital utilisation measures and insurance status
[Insert Table 1 about here]
The survey collects information on whether individuals have private health insurance
and the type of insurance coverage. The three coverage types include hospital, ancillary,
or both. We focus on whether individuals have private hospital insurance, that is if they
possessed either hospital only or combined cover. In the full sample of 7395 observations,
3828 (51.8%) individual have private hospital insurance. The survey also contains infor-
16mation on the whether individuals chose to be hospitalised as a public or private patient,
and the number of nights in hospital at the most recent hospitalisation episode. Table 1
shows the frequency of hospital nights by insurance status and patient type for the 962
individuals who have been hospitalised. Amongst the hospitalised individuals, 489 (50.8%)
individuals have private hospital insurance.
Three observations from the descriptive statistics in the Table 1 are noteworthy.
Firstly, the utilisation of private hospital care is signicantly higher among individuals
with private hospital insurance. Of the 489 insured individuals, 84.5% (N=413) chose to
be hospitalised as private patients while 15.5% (N=76) were public patients. Conversely,
only 9.7% (N=46) of 427 uninsured individuals chose private care, with 90.3% (N=427)
opting to be public patients. Secondly, uninsured individuals who chose public hospital
care stayed the highest number of nights { an average of 5.24 nights. In addition, among
individuals who chose to obtain private hospital care, those who are privately insured
were admitted for a longer duration compared with those without insurance (5.00 vs. 3.22
nights). Thirdly, the variance and range of the observed length of hospital stay is highest
for uninsured public patients followed by insured private patients.
4.4 Exogenous covariates
The explanatory variables that are used in this study can be classied into the follow-
ing categories: demographics and socioeconomic characteristics (e.g. age, gender, house-
hold income, levy status), health status measures (presence of chronic conditions), health
risk factors (drinker, smoker) and geographical information (state/territories, remoteness).
The choice of explanatory variables is similar to that in Cameron et al. (1988), Cameron
and Trivedi (1991), Savage and Wright (2003) and Propper (2000). In addition, we include
two variables that are obtained through external data sources. The rst is the size of the
\general and health insurance" industry workforce within the intermediate local area of
the survey respondents' residential location. This variable is derived using information on
industry and location of employment based on data from the 2001 Australian Census of
Population and Housing.3 The second variable is the distance to the nearest private hos-
3The industry category is Industry Code 742 (Other Insurance), which includes 7421 (Health Insurance)
and 7422 (General Insurance) based on the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industrial Classica-
tion (ANZSIC) in 1993. The unit of reference for dening the location of employment is the Statistical
17pital from the survey respondents' location of residence. This is dened as the euclidian
distance between the centroids of the postal area of survey respondents' and the postal
area of the nearest private hospital.4 Distance is calculated using data on the coordinates
(longitude and latitude) of centroids via the haversine formula.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
The variables names, description and summary statistics of these explanatory variables
are presented in Table 2. Females make up 54% of the sample. The average age of
individuals in the sample is 49.36 years, with a range 25 and 99 years. 76% of individuals
are from couple income units and 43% have dependent children. In terms of education
attainment, 45% do not have any post-school educational qualications (Year 12 and
below) while 23% have a bachelor degree or higher. The mean annual household income
is $68,297. 23% of the sample have a level of household income that is above the income
threshold and are required to pay the Medicare Levy Surcharge if they do not have private
health insurance. On the distribution of the sample by occupational types, 37% are either
not in the labour force or are unemployed and the two largest groups are \Professionals"
(26%) and \Clerical and Service workers" (16%).
Measures of individuals' health status include indicators of self assessed health status
(SAH) collected in wave 3, and a set of binary variables that indicate the presence of chronic
conditions that aect physical and social functioning. We employ the SAH measures from
the wave 3 survey to avoid issues of reverse causation as the outcome of interest is health
care use that occur in the 12 months preceding the survey. In terms of SAH, 47% of
individuals reported to be in excellent or very good health, with 35% indicating that
their health is good and 18% fair and poor. 38% of individuals reported having chronic
conditions that limit the type and amount of work they can do; 4.0% indicated that
they have diculty with self care activities; 8.2% have limitations in mobility activities
and 0.8% have diculty communicating in their own language. Indicators of health risk
factors include whether individuals consume alcohol daily (9.6%) and are regular smokers
Subdivision (SSD), a spatial unit of intermediate size. In the 2001 Australian Standard Geographical
Classication, there were a total 207 SSDs, with each SSD containing an average of 22 postal areas. The
postal codes of respondents in the HILDA survey are linked to the SSD using the 2001 Australian Bureau
of Statistics (ABS) \Statistical Subdivision and Postal Area Concordance" data that is available by request
from the ABS.
4Data on the centroids of postal areas are obtained from Australian Bureau of Statistics (2006).
18(18%). Geographical information include state/territory indicators as well as remoteness
categories. Approximately 59% of individuals reside in major cities in Australia. The
average size of the general and health insurance workforce within a statistical subdivision
is 866 and the mean distance to the nearest private hospital is 30 km.
4.5 Identication and exclusion restrictions
Formally, the econometric model described in Section 3 is identied by the nonlinearity of
the functional form and error distributions. However, the reliance on such an identication
scheme is unappealing. In the econometric model, equations (14) and (15) constitute a
Poisson lognormal regression with endogenous insurance and patient type binary variables,
and equation (16) is a probit model with an endogenous insurance variable. Identication
requires that there is at least one variable in W that is excluded from Z and X , and one
variable that is in Z that is excluded in X.
To satisfy the rst set of exclusion restrictions, we include the size of the general and
health insurance workforce in the insurance equation but not in the patient type choice and
length of stay equations. We argue that this variable performs the role as a proxy for the
accessibility to insurance services which inuences the ease to which individuals can acquire
information on health insurance products. This variable is likely to inuence whether
individuals choose to purchase private hospital insurance but not the choice between public
and patient hospital care and the intensity of hospital stay.
For the second exclusion restriction, we include the distance to the nearest private
hospital in the patient type equation but exclude the variable from the length of stay
equation. Data on distance to hospitals have frequently been employed as instruments to
address selection bias in studies on treatment outcomes and hospital quality (e.g. Mc-
Clellan et al. 1994; Gowrisankaran and Town 1999). For our purpose, individuals' choice
to seek private or public hospital care is based on a variety of factors which include the
types and severity of illness, the availability of private hospital insurance, as well as the
proximity of private hospitals. The distance to private hospitals is very likely to be un-
correlated with the unobserved type and severity of individuals' medical conditions and
for this reason would justify as an excluded variable in the length of stay equation.
We impose an additional restriction that the levy variable is included only in the
19insurance equation. This variable accounts for whether individuals are liable to pay the
Medicare Levy Surcharge if they do not purchase private health insurance and is expected
to inuence only the decision to insure. All other exogenous covariates, apart from the
exclusions discussed above, are included all three equations.
5 Results
We estimated a variety of models with dierent combinations of the correlation parameters
v; and v being restricted to zero. In a model specication where all three correlation
parameters are set equal to zero, the length of stay is estimated using a Poisson lognormal
model and the patient type and insurance equations are estimated using separate probit
regressions. An implicit assumption underlying this specication is that the patient type
and insurance binary regressors are exogenous.
The estimates and standard errors of the correlation parameters are presented at the
bottom of Table 3. The log-likelihood for the simultaneous equation model (-6681.22) is
larger compared to the separate regression models (-6681.21), the latter calculated as the
sum of the log-likelihood values from the three separate regressions. These results show
that the estimates of all three correlation parameters are both individually and jointly
not statistically signicant from zero, and indicates that the insurance and patient type
binary variables are not endogenous. For the discussion of the estimates on the insurance
and patient type eects in Section 3, the results from the simultaneous equation will be
compared with that obtained under the single equation models. The discussion in the
remaining sections of this paper will be based on former model.
5.1 Marginal eects of insurance and patient type
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Table 3 presents the marginal eects and standard errors of the insurance and patient
type binary variables in the public/private choice and hospital length of stay equations.
The estimates from the simultaneous equation model described in Section 3 is presented in
the column 2. For comparison, the results from the single equation Poisson lognormal and
probit regressions for the length of stay and public/private patient choice respectively are
20presented in column 3. In the public/private choice equation, the estimate of the marginal
eect of the insurance binary variable is 0.700 and statistically signicant. All else being
equal, individuals with private hospital insurance are 70% more likely to be admitted into
hospital care as a private patient. This result is expected given that the availability of
private hospital insurance reduces the eective monetary price of private hospital care and
hence insured individuals are more likely to seek private relative to public hospital care.
The estimate obtained from the probit regression, under the exogeneity assumption, is
0.738 and is very similar in magnitude.
Moving on to the hospital length of stay equation, the insurance and patient type
binary variables, combined with their interaction, reveal the eect of insurance on length
of hospital stay for private and public patients separately. Here, two eects are of interest.
The rst is the moral hazard eect5 which is the dierence in the expected length of
stay between privately admitted individuals with or without private hospital insurance.
From the theoretical model described in Section 2, we observe that individuals who are
privately insured face a lower eective monetary price for private care, and are expected
to use private care at a greater intensity. From column 2, the estimate of the insurance
eect among privately admitted patients is 2.457 which is indicative that private patients
with insurance have proportionally higher expected length of stay compared with those
without insurance. This estimate is however not statistically signicantly larger than 1.
The estimate from the Poisson lognormal model is very similar in magnitude compared to
that for the simultaneous equation model and is statistically signicantly larger than 1.
This result suggest that the expected length of private hospital stay by privately insured
individuals is 2.537 times higher than that for the uninsured.
The second result of interest is the eect of insurance on the length of stay for publicly
admitted patients. This is termed as the insurance on public patient eect.6 Insofar as the
insurance variable reect the incentive eects of insurance, we would expect a priori that
private hospital insurance would have no impact on the intensity of public hospital care use.
This is observed in the empirical results, given that the estimate of the public patient eect
5The moral hazard eect is calculated as E(LOS jinsurance = 1, privatepatient = 1, X) /
E(LOS jinsurance = 0, privatepatient = 1, X).
6The insurance on public patient eect is calculated as E(LOS jinsurance = 1, privatepatient = 0,
X) / E(LOS jinsurance = 0, privatepatient = 0, X).
21is not signicantly smaller than 1. The third outcome of interest is the dierence in the
expected length of stay between publicly and privately admitted patients. This is referred
to in Table 3 as the patient type eect. The result indicates that the length of hospital
stay by private patients is on average 0.414 times that of publicly admitted patients. The
estimate from the single equation model is also similar in terms of magnitude.
5.2 Other ndings
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 4 presents the marginal eects and standard errors of the
other explanatory variables on the length of hospital stay. The expected length of hospital
stay is signicantly higher for individuals with dependent children, and for those who
were not born in Australia. The estimates on the other demographic variables suggest
that length of hospital stay is higher for females in the childbearing years, although this
estimate, together with those of age and gender, are generally not statistically signicant.
The coecients on the age and squared age variables (not reported in Table 4) indicate
an inverse U-shape relationship between age and the intensity of hospital stay.
Compared with those who are not in employment, the expected length of stay is shorter
for individuals in `white collar' occupations such as managers, professionals and clerical
workers. Individuals in `blue collar' occupations such as tradespersons and labourers on
the other hand have relatively higher duration of hospital stay. A possible explanation
for the shorter length of stay as suggested by the theoretical model is that individuals
in \white collar" occupations face a higher opportunity cost of time involved in seeking
hospital care which can otherwise be devoted to work or leisure. In addition, it is plausible
that occupation performs the role as a proxy for illness severity insofar that individuals
involved in manual work are likely to have more severe health conditions.
The estimates of the coecients on education suggest that the intensity of hospital
use is higher for individuals with more years of education. This result is consistent with
the theoretical predictions of Grossman's human capital model in that more educated in-
dividuals will choose a higher optimal stock of health and consequently undertake more
investments in health (Grossman 2000). Individuals' health status play the role of proxies
22for illness severity and we observed that expected length of stay is increasing with poorer
health as measured by the self assessed health status as well as the presence of chronic
medical conditions though the latter estimates are not generally not statistically signif-
icant. We expect that individuals undertaking risky behaviours such as regular alcohol
consumption and smoking may have more severe health conditions and require a higher
intensity of hospital care but the empirical results appear mixed.
Columns 4 and 5 in Table 4 presents the results on the factors that inuence the choice
of hospital admission as a public or private patient. Household income has a positive
eect on the propensity to seek private hospital care. This is expected given that private
health care is by nature a normal good and that the utilisation of private hospital services
may involve out-of-pocket payments even when private health insurance is available. We
observe that professionals are considerably more likely to obtain private care. A possible
channel by which income and employment characteristics can aect the propensity for
private hospital care is through their relationship with the monetary valuation of the time
spent on hospital waiting lists (Propper 1990, 1995). For instance, if the disutility of
waiting on hospital waiting lists is positively associated with income, one would expect
that high income individuals, all else being equal, would prefer private as compared to
public hospital care in which the latter is frequently associated with signicant waiting
lists. Individuals in relatively poorer health, measured in terms of self assessed health
status appears to be more likely to seek public care. To the extent that these health
status indicators proxy for the severity of individuals' illness conditions, this result is
consistent with the notion that individuals are more likely to seek private care for medical
conditions that are less severe (e.g. elective treatments). We expect that individuals living
further away from private hospitals may be less likely to obtain private care due to the
higher indirect cost (e.g. travel cost, time) involved. Our ndings suggest that this is the
case only for individuals who reside a considerable distance away from private hospitals.7
On the whole, the distance to the nearest private hospital is positively associated with the
7The coecients on distance and squared distance (not reported in Table 4) are 0.465 and -0.0717
respectively, and are both highly statistically signicant. The distance, beyond which the propensity for
private care becomes negatively related with distance, is 324 km (approximately three standard deviations
from the mean). An examination of the sample, for observations where distance to nearest private hospital
is greater than 324 km, revealed that individuals are all residing in outer regional and remote areas within
Australia.
23likelihood of obtaining private care.
Columns 6 and 7 of Table 4 presents the results on the decision to purchase private
hospital insurance. Females and individuals who are older are more likely to have private
hospital insurance. The propensity to insure is also higher for couple households and
lower for those with dependent children. Individuals whose household income are above
the Medicare Levy Surcharge threshold, and are liable for the additional tax levy if they
do not have private health insurance, are more likely to purchase private health insurance.
Socioeconomic factors such as income and post school education qualcations are positively
associated with the purchase of insurance. Individuals in `white collar' occupations are
more likely to be privately insured compared to `blue collar' workers and those not in
employment. Privately insured individuals are more likely to be in better self assessed
health and are more likely to be without chronic conditions. Health risk factors such
as regular smoking decreases the propensity to purchase private hospital insurance. On
geographical factors, individuals living in Victoria and Western Australia have a higher
probability of purchasing private hospital insurance relative to those living in New South
Wales. Finally, individuals residing in geographical areas with a larger health insurance
workforce, and hence potentially have more access to insurance services and information,
are more likely to be privately insured.
6 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Individuals' decision-making on the utilisation of hospital services in the mixed public-
private hospital system in Australia involve the decision on whether to purchase health
insurance, to obtain public or private hospital care and the intensity of care. Previous
Australia-based studies have examined only the demand for private health insurance and
health care, while several UK-based studies have investigated the determinants that inu-
ence the choice of public or private health care. To our knowledge, this work is the rst
attempt to empirically examine the demand for health insurance, public or private choice
and the intensity of health care in a simultaneous framework.
Our ndings indicate that the length of hospital stay by privately admitted patients is
on average signicantly shorter than that of public (Medicare) patients. This is suggestive
24that systematic dierences exist in the types of medical conditions that individuals choose
to seek public or private hospital care. This nding is consistent with the evidence pre-
sented in Sundararajan et al. (2004) and Hopkins and Frech (2001) and supportive of the
view that the public hospital system is utilised by patients with more complex and severe
medical conditions requiring a greater intensity of treatment than that in private hospi-
tals. From a policy perspective, the results of this study suggest that the impact of private
health insurance on alleviating the burden on the public hospital system is not expected
to be large. With the increase in the uptake of private hospital insurance, individuals
that are most likely to substitute private for public hospital care are those already waiting
on public hospital waiting lists or have been discouraged by the long queues and have
forgone seeking treatment altogether. Given that the expected duration of wait on public
hospital waiting lists is inversely related to the severity of medical conditions, and the
urgency of treatments, what follows is that individuals who seek private hospital care do
so for non-urgent medical conditions where the required treatment is simpler and elective
in nature.
We nd some evidence of moral hazard eect of private hospital insurance amongst
patients who sought hospital care as a private patient. This result is consistent with
the ndings of studies by Savage and Wright (2003) and Cameron et al. (1988) who
found signicant moral hazard eects among specic sub-population groups. Savage and
Wright (2003) estimated that the duration of private hospital stay is approximately 1.5
to 3.2 times longer amongst individuals with insurance for elderly couples, couples with
dependents and young singles.8 Similarly, Cameron et al. (1988) found a higher number
of hospital days for insured relative to non-insured individuals in lower income groups but
not for those in higher income brackets.
It is important to emphasise that within the context of a parallel public and private
hospital care system such as Australia's, the `incentive' or `moral hazard' eect of pri-
vate health insurance refers to the incremental use of private health care resulting from
a decrease in the eective price of obtaining private care due to the presence of private
8The authors found that the estimated moral hazard eect diers for individuals from dierent income
unit composition. The length of hospital stay by elderly individuals from couple-type income units with
private hospital insurance are 3.23 times higher than equivalent individuals who are uninsured. Duration
of stay by privately insured couples with dependents are 2.78 times higher as compared to the equivalent
without insurance. No evidence of moral hazard were observed for the remaining income unit groups.
25insurance. This phenomenon is unique to countries with parallel systems of nance and is
to be distinguished from how moral hazard is traditionally interpreted in countries where
health care is aorded predominantly through a single source of nance. For this reason,
the empirical strategy adopted in this paper implicitly assumes that the probability of
hospitalisation is exogenous. Strictly speaking, the eect of private insurance on whether
or not an individual is hospitalised cannot be interpreted as indicative of moral hazard
because the outcome variable represents both public and/or private hospital care use. In
addition, our empirical strategy is congruent to modeling length of hospital stay and the
public/private patient choice using only observations from the sub-sample of hospitalised
individuals, which is the approach is adopted by Savage and Wright (2003). An alternative
approach is to explicitly model the probability of hospitalisation by extending the econo-
metric model to a four-equation model which would involve a separate set of exclusion
restrictions in addition to those that have been proposed in this paper. This extension
however is not attempted in this paper and left as a potential area of future work.
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30Table 1: Summary statistics of key outcomes for hospitalised individuals
Without Insurance With Insurance
(N=473) (N=489)
Hospital Public Patient Private Patient Public Patient Private Patient Total
Nights (N=427) (N=46) (N=76) (N=413) (N=962)
Pr(m=1) 110 (25.8%) 24 (52.2%) 32 (42.1%) 127 (30.8%) 293 (30.5%)
Pr(m=2) 65 (41.0%) 6 (65.2%) 6 (50.0%) 53 (43.6%) 130 (44.0%)
Pr(m=3) 64 (56.0%) 3 (71.7%) 10 (63.2%) 38 (52.8%) 115 (55.9%)
Pr(m=4) 38 (64.9%) 2 (76.1%) 5 (69.7%) 38 (62.0%) 83 (64.6%)
Pr(m=5)a 36 (73.3%) 2 (80.4%) 5 (76.3%) 54 (75.1%) 97 (74.6%)
Range 1-135 1-21 1-21 1-80 1-135
Mean 5.24 3.22 4.66 5.00 5.04
Variance 82.32 14.44 35.16 51.88 62.37
a For brevity, only frequencies up to Pr(m=5) are presented for the count utilisation measure. See `Range' for
information on all realisations.
Note: Percentages in the parenthesis are cumulative frequencies.
31Table 2: Descriptive statistics: explanatory variables (N=7395)
Variable Description Mean Std dev
Female Female (0/1) 0.54 0.50
Age Age 49.36 15.16
Age2 Squared age 2665.76 1623.87
Couple Couple income unit (1/0) 0.76 0.43
Depchild Have dependent children (1/0) 0.43 0.50
Childbear Female age between 25 to 39 years (1/0) 0.17 0.38
Income Annual household income ($ `000) 68.30 59.54
Income2 Squared annual household income 8209.07 31380.99
Levy Household income above Medicare Levy Surcharge
threshold (0/1) 0.23 0.42
Country of birth:
Australia (Ref ) Person is born in Australia (0/1) 0.77 0.42
Main English Person is born in main english speaking countries (0/1) 0.12 0.33
Other Person is born in other countries (0/1) 0.11 0.32
Education qualication (qual.):
School (Ref ) Highest qual. is Year 12 or below (0/1) 0.45 0.50
Certicate Highest qual. is a Certicate (0/1) 0.22 0.42
Diploma Highest qual. is a (Advanced) Diploma (0/1) 0.10 0.30
Degree Highest qual. is a degree or above(0/1) 0.23 0.42
Occupation category:
Unemploy (Ref) Not in employment (0/1) 0.37 0.48
Manager/Admin Managers and Administrators (0/1) 0.070 0.25
Professional Professionals (0/1) 0.26 0.44
Clerical/Service Clerical and Service workers (0/1) 0.16 0.36
Trades/Transport Trades, Production, Transport, Labourers (0/1) 0.15 0.35
Self assessed health (SAH):
SAH VG (Ref ) SAH in t-1 is excellent or very good (0/1) 0.47 0.50
SAH GD SAH in t-1 is good (0/1) 0.35 0.48
SAH FP SAH in t-1 is fair or poor (0/1) 0.18 0.39
Chronic health conditions (conds.):
Work Limiting Conds. limit amount and type of work (0/1) 0.38 0.67
Self Care Conds. causes diculties with self care (0/1) 0.040 0.20
Mobility Conds. causes diculties with mobility activities (0/1) 0.082 0.28
Communication Conds. causes diculties with communication (0/1) 0.0080 0.089
Alcohol Daily Person drinks alcohol daily (0/1) 0.096 0.30
Regular Smoker Person is a regular smoker (0/1) 0.18 0.38
State:
NSW (Ref ) Person lives in New South Wales (0/1) 0.30 0.46
VIC Person lives in Victoria (0/1) 0.25 0.43
QLD Person lives in Queensland (0/1) 0.20 0.40
SA Person lives in South Australia (0/1) 0.094 0.29
WA Person lives in Western Australia (0/1) 0.10 0.30
TAS/NT Person lives in Tasmania or Northern Territory (0/1) 0.038 0.19
ACT Person lives in the Australian Capital Territory (0/1) 0.019 0.14
Remoteness:
Major cities (Ref ) Person resides in major cities (0/1) 0.59 0.49
Inner region Person resides in inner regional areas (0/1) 0.27 0.44
Other Person resides in outer regional and (very) remote (0/1) 0.14 0.35
Headcount Number ('000) of the persons working in the health and general 0.866 1.998
insurance industry (respondents' residential local area)
Headcount2 Squared headcount 4.74 19.59
Distance Euclidian distance (in km) to the nearest private hospital 0.29 0.92
Distance2 Squared distance 0.93 6.78
32Table 3: Marginal eects of the patient type and insurance variables
Simultaneous Poisson
Equation Model Lognormal/Probit
dF=dX Std. err. dF=dX Std. err.
- Public/Private Patient -
Insurance eect 0.700*** 0.184 0.738*** 0.026
- Hospital Length of Stay a -
Moral hazard eect 2.457 1.094 2.537** 0.626
Insurance on public patient eect 0.858 0.319 0.891 0.156
Patient type eect 0.414*** 0.165 0.444*** 0.108




Log-likelihood value -6681.22 -6681.21
***, **, * denote signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For marginal eects on the
binary variables in the length of stay equation, the null hypothesis is H0 : ej = 1.
aMarginal eects are interpreted as proportional change in expected length of stay.
bRobust standard errors clustered at level of the household.
33Table 4: Marginal eects of the remaining explanatory variables
Length of Stay Public/Private Insurance
dF=dX Std. err. dF=dX Std. err. dF=dX Std. err.
Female 0.990 0.099 0.0096 0.051 0.039*** 0.013
Age 0.978 0.022 -0.0059 0.0015 0.031*** 0.0036
Childbear 1.127 0.186 -0.066 0.094 -0.0023 0.022
Depchild 1.418** 0.177 -0.052 0.072 -0.053*** 0.020
Couple 0.930 0.100 -0.042 0.058 0.092*** 0.020
Country of Birth:
Main English 1.088 0.139 -0.068 0.071 -0.142*** 0.022
Others 1.263* 0.161 -0.193*** 0.066 -0.119*** 0.024
Income 1.000 0.0019 0.0031** 0.0015 0.0039*** 0.00046
Levy 0.101*** 0.030
Education:
Certicate 1.110 0.116 0.0026 0.062 0.030* 0.017
Diploma 1.141 0.164 0.030 0.089 0.107*** 0.022
Degree 1.108 0.151 -0.056 0.082 0.134*** 0.020
Occupation:
Manager/Admin 0.829 0.174 0.0056 0.119 0.231*** 0.028
Professional 0.773 0.097 0.194*** 0.071 0.136*** 0.021
Clerical/Service 0.829 0.122 0.053 0.092 0.096*** 0.022
Trades/Transport 1.089 0.189 0.039 0.108 -0.017 0.025
Self Assessed Health:
SAH GD 1.028 0.109 -0.043 0.056 -0.012 0.015
SAH FP 1.300* 0.159 -0.065 0.069 -0.091*** 0.021
Work Limiting 1.107 0.069 0.064** 0.032 -0.010 0.011
Self Care 1.119 0.180 0.0015 0.087 -0.027 0.038
Mobility 1.100 0.140 0.036 0.069 -0.039 0.028
Communication 1.110 0.262 -0.194 0.173 -0.122 0.077
Alcohol Daily 1.167 0.150 -0.016 0.080 0.035 0.024
Regular Smoker 0.883 0.109 -0.141** 0.067 -0.150*** 0.019
State:
VIC 0.941 0.100 -0.033 0.062 0.032* 0.021
QLD 0.886 0.105 0.042 0.064 -0.033 0.024
SA 0.845 0.104 0.061 0.072 0.036 0.030
WA 0.959 0.152 0.090 0.083 0.080*** 0.028
TAS/NT 1.386 0.285 -0.047 0.114 -0.0047 0.045
ACT 0.326*** 0.125 -0.069 0.124 0.072 0.067
Remoteness:
Inner region 1.046 0.098 -0.077 0.058 -0.048** 0.022
Other 1.039 0.121 -0.199** 0.091 -0.053 0.037
Headcount 0.041*** 0.011
Distance 0.127* 0.077 -0.041* 0.025
Heterogeneity  0.963*** 0.038
***, **, * denote signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For marginal eects on the binary variables
in the length of stay equation, the null hypothesis is H0 : ej = 1.
aThe marginal eects of age and household income are interpreted as a percentage change resulting
from a unit increment in the explanatory variables.
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